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TOWARDS A COMPLEX ADAPTIVE
LINK PREDICTION
IN HEALTH INSURANCE FRAUD
Szabolcs Feczak and Liaquat Hossain
Project Management Graduate Programme, The University of Sydney, Australia
Email: {szabolcs.feczak|liaquat.hossain}@sydney.edu.au
Abstract
In this paper, we provide a comprehensive review of methodology for detecting
anomalies based on the literature, industry expert and our findings. We elicit links
between health service providers based on their shared customer base. Looking at the
connections of providers, their geographical arrangements and statistical comparison
of profile attributes, we highlight links which could be classified as suspicious or
fraudulent behaviour.
Keywords: social networks, link prediction, graphs, anomaly detection, insurance, fraud

1.0

Introduction

The aim of fraud prevention is to maximise crime reduction without too much
overhead on the core business activity (Cahill et al., 2004 & Sun, 2004). In Figure 1,
we present a conceptual overview highlighting different boundaries of anti-fraud
operation in insurance claims processing.
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Figure 1: Boundaries of anti-fraud operation in an insurance company.
Towards sparing resources an automated screening facility is fundamental to
improving efficiency of the process. It is possible to automate the process because
decisions on the acceptance of a claim are governed by insurance policy and medical

rules. Bulk of these rules can be described with algorithms. Since human workforce is
more expensive than computational processing power and system development in the
long run, reducing the involvement of people in the decision making improves
efficiency. Principally, these systems do not require interaction with the customer
unless the claim is suspicious and put on hold for investigation. This helps to keep a
better image of the company (Major & Riedinger, 2002).
The requirement for human intervention for most cases is dependent on the
complexity of the claims as well as the rules associated with the claims. Anti-fraud
operations can consume fair bit of human resources, because in most cases it is
difficult to draw the distinction between fraud and error. Claims which were
deliberately falsified or altered in order to gain financial benefit are unlawful and
labelled as fraud, while genuine mistakes are considered to be errors (Sparrow, 1996).
We therefore, suggest that an analogy between what constitutes intentional or non
intentional error could be used as a metaphor for establishing the ground of fraud.
Additional clues are required to be gathered to make a reliable decision. This can
be a lengthy process involving a legal team. To be time wise efficient paying claims,
complex analytical processes are performed on historical data only not in real time.
This however implies, that recovering money is uncertain from any fraudulent claim
identified retrospectively, since the claims have already been paid, before the
investigation was finished. Therefore, it is desired to capture problems upfront or
minimise the possibility (Sparrow, 1996).
The aim of this paper is to provide methodological framework based on social
network methods and related theories for examining possible fraudulent behaviour in
health insurance claims processing. We draw the relationship between network
structure and criminal activity for flagging potential boundary cross over. We build
our model on the basis of classical theories originating from error detection and social
networks for presenting a framework to increase the reliability and effectiveness of
the anti-fraud operations.

2.0

Background to the study

Deception for personal gain is considered to be unlawful and can be labelled as
fraud. As long as the intention behind the act is not proven, it is considered to be a

mistake or error, therefore we look through error detection methods first.
Traditional methods of error detection use threshold, decision based on profiling
and tracking. Profiling has become best practice over threshold . There has also been
a shift from detection towards prediction and prevention (Cahill, Lambert, Pinheiro, &
Sun, 2004). Adaptivity and in combination of advanced technologies such as neural
networks, fuzzy logic and genetic algorithms are required to reliably predict
infringements (Phua, Lee, Smith, & Gayler, 2005).
Adaptive systems are usually based on one of the two types of machine learning-unsupervised and

supervised learning. Unsupervised methods do not perform

optimally under the condition of uneven class sizes and uncertain class membership.
This is due to that fact that the system can let fraudulent transaction through, even
though a false alarm would be triggered on a legitimate one which is a similar issue to
the traditional threshold method. However, supervised methods can only be used if
prior sets with classification are available and reliably identified by other methods
manually. Supervised learning algorithms can help to satisfy the adapting
requirement. Common algorithms used are: bayes, foil, ripper, cart, c4 (Bolton &
Hand, 2002).
The observations in detecting irregularities specifically in the health insurance
sector focuses on: behavioural heuristics, the flow of dollars, medical logic, frequency
and volume of treatments, geographic origin, time and sequence of activities,
granularity, identification process (Fawcett & Provost, 1997; Major & Riedinger,
2002).
A case is marked fraudulent once the accused is convicted by court order.
However in a broad sense even in science literature fraud is analogical with potential
fraud, unusual and suspicious behaviour
Differential association theory (Chambliss, 1984) links fraud detection with the
study of social networks. Social network in this paper refers to a structure of
individuals or organisations in reality, rather than as commonly used today describing
online databases and services with a web interface. Differential association theory
claims that a person turns away from the lawful life, when the balance of explanations
for violation of the law surpasses law-abiding and supported by social affiliation.
Therefore, criminal behaviour is observed to be learned through socialising with

closed group of criminals. Not only the behaviour but motives and techniques and
legal loopholes are also learned through the aforementioned association. Relation to a
criminal society can vary in priority, duration and intensity. Therefore, learning by
association has been seen as an emerging theory for explaining the link the
socialisation and learned behaviour
Inspired by the fact that “… fraudsters seldom work in isolation ...” (Bolton &
Hand, 2002) we have a good reason to believe that social network analysis could
support prevention and detection methods. There is clearly a need for support of the
existing techniques since machine learning algorithms do not perform reliably on their
own. A combination of different algorithms was proposed to improve the reliability.
However as visible on Figure 2 last column pair, even combination of Probabilistic,
Best match, Density selection and Negative selection algorithms only reach 50%
reliability in fraud detection.

Figure 2: Reliability of different algorithms and combination of them.
We therefore, introduce social networks and its analytics in developing a better
understanding of the detection of error and or fraud here.
2.1

Social Network Measures
Social network measures deal with quantifying network structure properties and

provides models to understand information flow, the evolution of the network, the role
of nodes and links with certain properties and the effect of the changes in the network.
The networks are built through interactions of nodes, usually human beings but can be
informational systems, which makes the research area to overlap with human

computer interaction. The principal measures are size, centrality, density and link
weights.
In social networks, centrality denotes the structural power position of a node in a
given network. Centrality has three basic measures

Freeman degree centrality -

number of adjacent nodes, closeness - reciprocal value of the total number of hops in
the shortest possible way to every other node, and betweeness - number of times the
node appears on the shortest path between other nodes. The higher the value is the
more influence can a particular node has on the entire network. Competitive
advantage for example can be explained by control on information flow. Entities
bridging network segments which otherwise would not be connected just through the
particular node are in advantageous position which they can benefit from by using the
information flowing through them or controlling dissemination for their own good
(Burt, 1995). Centrality is not only understood on nodes, a characteristic. Value can be
calculated for the total network as well using any if the above measures.
Network density is the number of links divided by the number of all theoretically
possible links (Freeman, 1979; Hanneman & Riddle, 2001).
Tie strength is another measure which is the weight of the links between the nodes
and it can be used to explaining information flow. For example, too densely connected
actors provide mostly redundant, already known information. This noise causes a
delay which has a negative effect on cooperative work. It is also argued that new and
innovative information is usually received through weak ties because strong ties share
common information (Granovetter, 1973, 1983).
2.2

Health Insurance sector
There are unique contextual features which influence certain aspects of the case

study. The room for inconsistency between interpretations is fairly large, because
there are no common standards for codes and rules, therefore the compliance gap can
be quite substantial.
To put error detection into the context of our case study, we look at claim
processing. In case of misinterpretation of a rule we should label an unintentional act
as 'error' and deliberate misinterpretation or deception leading to any kind of unfair
advantage as 'fraud' by law (Sparrow, 1996).
The challenge here is to differentiate reliably between the two cases, since “it is

not possible to determine the presence of fraud from the data alone” (Bay,
Kumaraswamy, Anderle, Kumar, & Steier, 2006).
Certain thresholds are common to use to filter distinct member and provider
profiles against standards and averages of similar profile clusters. Profiles filtered
with values above threshold can be used as a basis of feedback to the particular
provider or member. If continuous abuse of the rules is recognised either from a fund
member or a service provider some sort of higher level disciplinary action should be
taken.
Health insurance funds are in a position to collect sensitive data, however the use
of this data is regulated by governmental privacy laws. Depending on the country
privacy laws can be substantially different in terms of strictness level. In Australia
these laws are extremely protective, even in cases where it would be common to
supply and use information it is prohibited.

3.0

Discussion

In this study, we ask: How does link analysis of customer/provider assist in
providing clue related to fraud? We explore collective fraudulent activities, focusing
on collusion between providers because it has a higher risk than collusion between
health service providers and insurance fund members. Furthermore, discovering
provider to provider agreements entails identifying the members associated with the
questionable transactions.
In order to identify possible connections between providers we need to predict
existing links. There are three types of approaches to do this (i) Probabilistic models
supported by machine learning algorithms such as Relational Bayesian, Markov and
Dependency Networks; (ii) Node wise and Topological similarity (iii) Maximum
likelihood. Probabilistic and maximum likelihood algorithms are powerful, but very
complex and computationally expensive (Lü, 2010). Configuring node wise prediction
which is based on information distance and similarity disregards link information,
they also required supervised methods and we did not have enough training data
available for this.

Figure 3: Demonstration of topological similarity link prediction
based on common neighbours.
Topological similarity method was selected due to its relative simplicity and
available implementation. There are several algorithms in the similarity framework,
for example: common neighbours, Jaccard’s coefficient, Adamic/Adar. Preferential
attachment has the lowest computational requirement as it does not require
information on neighbourhoods. (Lü, 2010) Multi dimensional networks are built of
different network layers and known to be challenging link prediction problem
scenario. (Lü, 2010) Network layers can be the same nodes linked up based on
different, often conflicting criteria. Another type of multi dimensionality is having
dissimilar class of nodes, like in our case providers and customers. On Figure 3 you
see a demonstration network with two different node classes. Providers are blue dots
and members members are red rectangular. Left hand side is the normal network
information representing the connections based on the data available. Right hand side
is the pure predicted network of providers.
Once we have identified the connections we would like to see how significant they
are and give an indication of the extent they are suspicious. The link between
providers and members is established based on claims. The insurance company
reimburses the fund member with a fraction of the service fee defined as benefit based
on the insurance policy in effect. These paid benefits are the subject of protection
against fraudulent activities. Therefore summarising the benefits in all transactions
between each provider, member pair gives us a dollar value significance in other
words the link weight. Representing these weights do not indicate level of irregularity
however they tell the possible impact factor.
It was demonstrated that link weights used for detection can be misleading. Using
the unweighed version of the similarity index algorithms outperformed their weighted
counterparts. Based on the weak ties theory: network connectivity is accounted

mainly to weak links, therefore they play an important role in link detection as well.
(Lü, 2009) Therefore we apply the detection algorithm in its simplest form,
establishing link on the slightest topological similarity and then apply weighting on
these established links using domain related predictors.
These predictors will differentiate between coincidental and suspicious links. We
propose to use a combined measure of (1) geographical distance (Phua, Lee, Smith, &
Gayler, 2005) and (2) shared customer base. (1) Members visiting different providers
in large geographical distances from each other is unusual practice, since most people
visit practitioners in convenient distances, so all of those linked generally would be in
the same area. Consequently providers linked based on shared customers in the same
area specially if they provide different type of services considered to be normal.
Another normal scenario is when a patient is referred to a specialist which can be far
away, however if (2) the proportion of common neighbours against the entire client
base is high that makes it look irregular. Combining one and two with a simple
addition expected to result in a good predictor for irregularity.
We induced a threshold of minimum ten shared customers based on histogram of
this value after performing link detection based on common neighbours in our sample.
After imposing this limit we got the core network of thirteen providers as it can be
seen on Figure 4.

Figure 4: Predicted core network of providers
extracted from real data with customers around them.

Further analysing this result graph customer nodes were hidden to focus on
provider connection with the network. Visualisation parameters were set to colour
nodes based on type of speciality and colour links according significance. The result
is presented on Figure 5. As discussed earlier to indicate significance we use a
summary of distance and shared customer base proportion as link weights. The more
weight a links carries the more suspicious the association is. Further to this if a node is
more central than others it means that it is more connected to other suspicious nodes.
Centrality is visualised with the size of the node on the figure. Whenever we see
nodes with same colour linked to each other that means same type of health service
providers are sharing customers. All

this information provides clues to spot

irregularities. Looking at the figure we have to keep in mind that this is a limited set
of the entire data with certain thresholds, so to get a comprehensive picture it would
worth going back to the original full data set and extract all data related to the
providers in question. We can then use the ego centric approach to keep the analysed
data on a manageable level.

Figure 5: Predicted core network of providers in a filtered data set.

4.0
4.1

Data
Description and scope

We were given access to claims processing data of a major Australian health
insurance fund. Four years of data contains over 65 thousand providers, 2 million
customers and 28 million claim entries.
Clustering is inevitable to derive sensible results and to be able to process the data
in reasonable amount of time. Based on the recommendations of the industry expert in
health insurance fraud we have targeted a specific geographical area first, denoted by
a single postcode. In order to avoid cutting off links of interest by the strict borders of
a post code we extended our data set using a number of steps:
selected all providers from the given post code
took all customers related through claims to these providers.
extracted all claims of these customers
based on the resulted claim set collected all providers involved
4.2

Filtering
The result set was still extremely large after clustering still had over a hundred

thousand claims and couple of thousand providers. At the particular fund we are
working with, internal provider codes are used. Therefore we had to make sure we
eliminate these providers first. Internal providers are considered to be trusted and
much more claims are running through them than individual providers, so keeping
them in would have biased our analysis. Our aim was to filter the sub-set of data to be
able to focus on the top 100 health service providers of interest. The interest of the
insurance fund is the amount of benefit paid to these providers, hence most of our data
filtering is based on dollar values. The first steps in filtering included:
calculate accumulated benefit over the years per provider and keep only the top 100
From network analysis perspective we need at least two links to different providers
from a customer to be able to predict a connection between providers. Furthermore
the links need to be significant
remove customers who did not have claims through at least two providers
remove transactions below average grouped by customer and provider pairs
4.3

Data preparation for analysis
We planned to use the Organizational Risk Analyzer (ORA) (Carley & Reminga,

2004) application from Carnegie Mellon University for analysis because it has the
folding of networks based on shared links function implemented. First step was to
format the relational data extract we have acquired from the insurance fund according
to the needs of Social Network Analysis application. To do so we have taken the
following steps in the first pass:
selected the total dollar value of benefits grouped by customer, provider pairs and
year month
exported the result into a coma separated value file
inserted two new columns manually: source node class, destination node class
The dollar value summaries served as link weights and the two new columns were
filled with equal row values: customer, provider accordingly. The year month field
was given in the database and we have used it as network identifier so once imported
into ORA it further clustered the data based on time. Time information can also be
used to analyse network evolution and dynamics.
4.4

GPS location of providers
We wanted to analyse link weights not only on the flow of dollars, but based on

distances between providers as well. The following steps were prerequisite to
efficiently do this. The address field of the provider table was used to geographically
code the GPS coordinate of the providers. We have used the database of Google maps
to assign each provider with the appropriate longitude, latitude pair. Additionally to
our goals based on the coordinate set ORA automatically created regions finer than
postcode, and enabled us grouping the providers more precisely.
4.5

Shortest geographical distance of providers
We needed to calculate the distances between providers where there is a link and

assign the result as link weight. ORA was helpful to create network data from
relational data, however the output of this operation was an adjacency matrix. For our
purposes direction of the link is not important, therefore the matrix is symmetric,
hence half of the output is redundant. Furthermore, to add distances we only need data
on established links, however majority of the matrix was filled with zeros. Therefore,
adjacency matrix is difficult to process with standard applications such as a
spreadsheet calculator. NCOL format (Adai, Date, Wieland, & Marcotte, 2004) for
social network data is much more condensed and suitable to further processing the
data in relational database management systems as well. It has only three columns:

from node, to node, link weight and only established links are recorded. Therefore to
overcome the above issue we wrote a script, which converts an adjacency matrix into
NCOL format. (See in the appendix)
After the conversion we have loaded the result into a new relational database table
and another table with provider identifiers, longitude and latitude values. We have
matched the two tables based on the provider identifiers which resulted in coordinate
to coordinate pairs. Finally using a great-circle distance algorithm custom spreadsheet
macro we have calculated the distance between the linked providers.
4.6

Percentage of shared customer base
We have further explored the proportion of customers shared between the linked

providers for achieving higher precision in our analysis. To assign this attribute value
for each pair of linked providers, we have used a similar relational approach for
calculating the distances. Our first step was to binarize the adjacency network data
then fold the network based on shared customers. This resulted in a matrix where self
loops are the total number of customers and each link weight is the number of shared
customers. We divided these two numbers to get the proportion, which was calculated
for both nodes in a pair and the higher value was used (Bolton & Hand, 2002).

5.0

Conclusion

We have presented a comprehensive method to analyse health insurance claims
data combining social network methods with traditional profiling. A focus group
interview with a group of industry expert confirmed that the highlighted situations are
indeed suspicious. The industry expert panel further provides validation that existing
methods of detection were not able to highlight these providers to be suspicious. We
are waiting on the expert to verify our results by conducting further manual data
analysis and in case of reasonable doubt on site investigations. We see great
possibilities to continue and extend this work. Our next steps will be to analyse
network dynamics over time and look for clues in the evolution of the network. Also
to correlate the results with other moderating variables such as feedback, and to
combine our proposed predictor variable with the risk index already used at the fund.
Furthermore we have existing cases of investigated fraud which can help us to
develop a set of typical social network measures for potentially fraudulent networks.

Appendix
Simple python converts an adjacency matrix into NCOL format:
#!/usr/bin/env python
import csv
import sys
import re
m = []
r = csv.reader(open(sys.argv[1],'rb'))
for row in r:
m.append( [i for i in row] )
of = open(re.sub(".csv","-ncol",sys.argv[1]),'w')
for i in range(2,len(m)):
for j in range(1,i):
if (int(m[i][j])>0):
of.write ("%s;%s;%s\n" % (m[i][0],m[0][j],int(m[i][j])))
of.close()
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